The goals of this article were to determine whether the effi ciency of tax authorities in Croatia improved over the period [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012] 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The process of collecting taxes is far from cost-free. Indeed, the process involves certain costs that the literature typically divides into administrative costs (ACs) and compliance costs (CCs) (see, for example, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989 ). This paper focuses on ACs, which include public-sector costs related to the enforcement (administration) of existing tax legislation, including proposals for changes to that legislation that are proposed by the relevant public revenue collection authorities (for additional information, see and Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989:3) . A practical defi nition of ACs is also provided in Allers (1994:33) , who describes ACs as public-sector costs that either would not exist in the absence of a tax or would disappear if a particular tax were abolished.
There has been widespread research into this topic worldwide. 1 Based on an analysis of 60 studies on ACs and CCs since 1980, Evans (2003) concludes that in countries where ACs have been explored, the costs rarely exceed 1% of the tax revenues that are collected by the administration; further, ACs impose a smaller burden (in both absolute and relative terms) than do CCs (for additional details, see Evans, 2003:72) . The most prominent organisation that explores ACs is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has released fi ve publications with internationally comparable data on the tax systems and tax administrations of 52 countries (i.e., all of the OECD, EU and G20 countries) (OECD, 2004; 2006; 2009; 2011 and 2013) . According to the most recent OECD publication (2013), there are stark differences in AC-to-GDP ratios among the observed countries during the period 2004-2011; however, in one-third of those countries, the ratio ranged between 0.15% and 0.25%. A relatively low share of ACs in GDP (below 0.12%) is primarily observed in countries with low tax burdens and those where major taxes are not always administered by the national government (e.g., Chile, Estonia, Mexico and the USA). A continuous downward trend in this ratio is observed in a small number of countries, including Australia, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and the UK, but no explanation is offered as to the cause of this phenomenon.
In Croatia, the issue of ACs was fi rst explored by Ott and Bajo (2000) , who found that in the fi ve-year period between 1995 and 1999, ACs accounted for approximately 0.55% of GDP; given their size, these costs left substantial room for savings. The authors emphasised the importance of determining the ACs for each type of tax; however, they argued that this determination was impossible because there was no record of ACs by type of tax, and the allocation of overhead (general costs) to individual tax types posed a particular problem. Bratić and Pitarević (2004) found that ACs continued to account for an average of 0.55% of GDP during the period 1997-2001, but the accuracy and relevance of the data (which were diffi cult to access) pose a serious challenge for research. 2 Blažić (2004) The goals of this article were to determine whether the effi ciency of tax authorities in Croatia improved over the period 1997-2012 and to identify how their efficiency can be improved in the future. We argue, however, that a primary problem is a lack of information relevant to the examination of ACs in Croatia over a longer period of time. As a percentage of GDP, the total ACs of taxation in Croatia have fallen slightly over the past fi fteen years but remain above the average for EU member states. The OECD (2013:178) indicates that the effi ciency/effectiveness of tax authorities is typically assessed as the "cost-to-collection" ratio (calculated as the percentage share of ACs in the revenues that are collected by a country's tax administration). Assuming other variables remain constant, a decline in this indicator over time suggests a fall in relative costs (i.e., an effi ciency improvement) and/or a rise in collected revenues (i.e., an effectiveness improvement). However, according to the OECD (2013), this indicator should be interpreted with caution, as several factors that are unconnected with tax authorities' effi ciency/effectiveness can affect it. Other authors also emphasise the need for caution in cross-country comparisons of ACs using the "cost-to-collection" ratio (see Sand- 2 Researchers in other transitional countries have also faced both data unavailability and poor data quality when conducting their analyses. For example, in exploring ACs in the Czech Republic, Vitek and Pubal (2002) argue that data are only available at the aggregate level, which is often inadequate for calculating ACs and CCs for particular types of taxes.
ford, 1995:405; Sandford, 2000 and Evans, 2006) . For example, Sandford (2000:119-123) notes that cross-country comparisons based on the "cost-to-collection" ratio are diffi cult for the following reasons:
Data collection does not typically employ a standardised methodology in the different countries, as there are differences in how ACs are defi ned and in the types of revenues that are collected by tax authorities; for example, certain tax authorities collect social contributions and customs duties, whereas others do not. A country's demographic, political, social, economic and legal circumstances can have a strong infl uence on the "cost-to-collection" ratio because of the following: differences in the tax structure (e.g., the value added tax (VAT) registration threshold is low in some countries but high in others, and collecting taxes from a large number of small taxpayers results in high ACs); differences in the taxpayer structure (e.g., the larger the number of self-employed taxpayers, the higher the ACs); differences in tax rates (e.g., countries with large total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP have heavy tax burdens and are associated with lower "cost-to-collection" ratios than countries with similar taxes but lower tax burdens); changes in revenues that are not associated with changes in tax rates (e.g., unusual economic growth rates or infl ation); and several other factors that can infl uence the ratio, such as the introduction of new taxes.
Both Sandford (2000:123) and the OECD (2013) point out that the potential maximum tax revenues that can be collected by tax authorities are an extremely important factor, especially in international comparisons. Thus, countries with similar "cost-to-collection" ratios can be completely different with respect to effi ciency, which is measured as the ratio between collected and potential maximum tax revenues.
The OECD (2013:179-182) notes that the ratio between costs and GDP (calculated as the percentage share of ACs in GDP) might be more appropriate for international comparisons. However, this indicator should also be employed with caution, as several factors that are unrelated to tax authorities' effi ciency can infl uence the ratio between costs and GDP (e.g., large investments in new technologies, costs arising from a new tax or frequent GDP revisions).
Despite all these defi ciencies, ACs are calculated and compared to establish differences among countries. These differences, to the extent that they can be associated with the effi ciency of tax administrations, are then analysed and explored for each individual country (Sandford, 2000:137) . Therefore, we explain the research methodology for ACs in Croatia, and then we compare ACs between Croatia and the EU. Finally, we present conclusions on how to improve the effi ciency of the Croatian tax authorities.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
As noted above, ACs in Croatia include the costs of three institutions that are responsible for collecting taxes and customs duties: the TA, CA and FP. 3 ACs are primarily fi nanced from the state budget and, to a lesser extent, from these three institutions' own revenues. Ott and Bajo (2000) note that for a more complete analysis of Croatia's ACs, the total ACs should also include the costs of the institution that actually collects and maintains records of tax and customs duties; before 2001, this institution was the Payment Operations Institute, and since 2002, the institution has been the Financial Agency (FINA). Ott and Bajo (2000) also suggest including the costs of the courts that decide tax and customs cases in the analysis. 4 Regrettably, data on the costs of FINA and the courts could not be obtained, as they are not publicly available. A request for access to the information fi led with the Ministry of Justice and FINA was unsuccessful because (1) they responded that they were not in possession of the requested data; or (2) they promised to submit the data at a later date (but never did). According to FINA reports, its Treasury System Support Centre performs certain activities on behalf of the TA on a contract basis, but the centre invoices the Ministry of Finance (MF) instead of the TA 5 for those services. Therefore, the services that FINA provides on behalf of the TA and the costs of these services should be further investigated, as they are not produced by the TA but should be included in the ACs. However, these costs are currently reported within the MF's budget and are not clearly separated from other costs. the most important tasks of the CA is that it is responsible for the assessment and collection of customs duties, VAT and other mandatory public charges at the import and export of goods and implements customs control measures, including verifying the facts relevant to the taxation or customs clearance of goods. 4 The costs of courts imply the costs of administrative courts that are the first to adjudicate individual tax and customs disputes (in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek) and the costs of the High Administrative Court in Zagreb, which is the second to adjudicate these disputes (on appeals of first-instance decisions). The Gen eral Tax Act prescribes legal remedies in tax proceedings (Articles 159 through 171 of the Opći porezni zakon, NN 147/08, 18/11, 78/12, 136/12 and 73/13). 5 FINA performs the following revenue-related activities, the analytical records of which are maintained by the TA: (1) supporting the system of recording and assigning public revenues, and (2) conducting other activities on behalf of the TA, such as assessment activities, recording, supervision, collection and enforcement of certain local revenues on behalf of the local government units (for additional information, see FINA, 2012).
This article uses reports from the MF, TA and CA. 6 According to the economic classifi cation followed in Croatia's state budget, ACs include operational costs/ expenses (e.g., for employees, spent materials and IT services) and costs/expenses for the procurement of capital assets (e.g., buildings and offi ce equipment). However, these reports are often inadequate to perform the necessary analyses. Thus, determining the ACs for each tax is impossible because the costs are not monitored according to the type of tax. Moreover, it would be interesting to determine the specifi c amounts of tax revenues collected by the TA and the CA, but this was impossible in this study because we lacked data on the amount of the VAT on imports that is collected by the CA.
Nonetheless, this is the fi rst study on Croatia in which the collection costs of social contributions are included in the ACs for 2001 and 2002. Until 2001, social contributions were collected by separate institutions (i.e., the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, the Croatian Health Insurance Institute and the Croatian Employment Service), which had the status of extra-budgetary funds. The costs of these institutions (and revenues from social contributions) were not reported in the state budget. Researchers have been unable to include the costs that are generated by these institutions in the ACs, as the available data did not clearly indicate what share of these costs are related to the collection of social contributions versus the payment of various benefi ts (e.g., pensions, sickness benefi ts and health protection). Thus, previous studies did not include the costs of these institutions in the total ACs, and for the same reason, the revenues from social contributions collected were not included in the total revenues that are collected by tax authorities. 7 Although the TA performed certain activities related to social contributions 8 even before 2001, in July 2001, the TA became responsible for all of Croatia's operations related to social contributions, including the assessment, record-keeping, collection, supervision and enforcement of contributions, as well as the management of misdemeanour proceedings (Zakon o Poreznoj upravi, NN 67/01). Consequently, the TA budget (and thus the ACs) has included costs related to pensioninsurance contributions since 1 July 2001 and unemployment and health insurance contributions since 1 January 2002. Moreover, at the same time, revenues from social contributions are included in the total revenues that are collected by tax authorities.
The analysis of key indicators of the Croatian tax authorities' (in)effi ciency compared to the average indicators for EU member states is presented below. Then, we suggest costs that the Croatian tax authorities could reduce.
ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IN CROATIA IN THE PERIOD 1997-2012
As depicted in fi gure 1, the total ACs in Croatia declined by approximately 10% in 2012 from 1997 (from 0.48% to 0.44% of GDP). The largest AC-to-GDP ratio was recorded in 1999 (0.58%).
The sharpest declines in ACs were observed in 2000 and 2001, when a rise in GDP coincided with a decline in ACs in absolute terms. From 2005 to 2010, the AC-to-GDP ratio again increased but fell slightly after 2010 as the economic situation in Croatia deteriorated. As a result, in 2012, Croatia spent 0.44% of its GDP on administering tax and customs legislation. To establish whether the total ACs in Croatia are high, we compare them with the EU average, despite all of the constraints and defi ciencies (i.e., differences in methodology).
As plotted in fi gure 2, Croatia's ACs exceeded the EU average 9 (1995-2006; 2002-2012) ; Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012) . Finance (2000 Finance ( -2012 ; Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-2012) ; Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012) . 10 State budget non-tax revenues (such as property income, various administrative fees, and penalties) are not included into revenues collected by TA, CA and FP because we did not have information how much TA, CA and FP participate in administration of these revenues. This should be investigated in future studies. Additionally, because the TA collects taxes on behalf of some local government units, charging a fee in the amount of 5% of collected tax revenues, we wish to know the number of local government units for which the TA collects taxes in order to find out how much of these taxes should be included into revenues collected by TA. However, the TA has not responded to this inquiry, and this also remains to be investigated in future.
FIGURE 1 ACs in Croatia, as a percentage of GDP, 1997-2012

FIGURE 3 ACs in Croatia as percentage of collected tax revenues, 1997-2012* Sources: OECD (2013); Ministry of
FIGURE 2 A comparison of ACs between Croatia and the EU, as a percentage of GDP, 2005-2011
Specifi From the previous fi gures, it is possible to conclude that ACs in Croatia should be reviewed and if possible reduced. Thus, fi rst, there is a need to identify and review "nuisance" taxes that raise very little revenue (and may have high administrative and compliance costs as in other countries (see Chittenden, Foster, and Sloan, 2010:159)). It might be more effective if some of these "nuisance" taxes were entirely eliminated. Although there is a need for detailed analysis, at fi rst glance it appears that in Croatia some of following taxes might be strong candidates for "nuisance" taxes: certain property taxes (e.g., the public land use tax or second home tax), consumption taxes, excluding the VAT and excise taxes (e.g., trading name tax), and/or certain other small taxes (see annex 2). In other words, the "nuisance" taxes should be fi rst step of an investigation of ACs. (1995-2006; 2002-2012) ; Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012) . An analysis of fi nancial statements for the period 2004-2012 reveals that the largest expenses were recorded for staff and service expenses and accounted for the bulk of the total ACs (approximately 90% -table 1).
FIGURE 4 ACs in Croatia and the EU, as a percentage of collected revenues, 2005-2011
As table 2 indicates, staff and service expenses increased steadily over the observed period (staff expenses increased by 46%, from 631 million kuna to 921 million kuna, and service expenses increased by more than 330%, from 96 million kuna to 420 million kuna). Therefore, a detailed analysis of staff and service expenses is presented below. 
FIGURE 5 ACs by institution, in million kuna, 1997-2012
Croatia 11 was below the average of the EU member states. In the period 2005-2011, the EU average was approximately 70% of the total ACs. In a review of previous studies, Sandford (2000:118) reports that staff expenses represent the largest costs and typically account for approximately three-quarters of the total ACs.
From table 3, it is clear that particular attention should be devoted to analysing IT services expenses, as they increased from approximately 3% to 51% of total service expenses in the period from 2004 to 2012. It is interesting that these IT services expenses are only related to maintenance and support for existing software and not to purchasing new software/hardware.
As shown in table 4, of service expenses, expenses for IT services grew the most rapidly (by more than 7,000%, from approximately 3 million kuna to 214 million kuna). Leasing and rental expenses also increased sharply (by more than 300%, from 7 million kuna to 30 million kuna), as did intellectual and personal-service expenses (by approximately 800%, from 2 million kuna to 21 million kuna). Expenses for telephone, mail and transportation services were also high in absolute terms during the observed period, as they constituted an average of approximately 90 million kuna annually. Consequently, both the TA and CA should analyse the mentioned expenses in detail and examine whether and to what extent these expenses should be reduced. (1995-2006; 2002-2012) ; Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012) . Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether increases/decreases in ACs are related to tax legislation changes in Croatia; one could determine whether the total ACs rose during the years in which the most radical changes in the national tax system occurred. One can assume that every change in tax law leads to a rise in ACs, as there is, for example, a need for new employees to manage a more complex system. Annex 3 reports major changes in the most important types of taxes (the personal income tax, corporate income tax, VAT and social contributions) in Croatia in the period 1997-2012. However, as changes in tax legislation are frequent in Croatia (tax rates and/or tax bases are changed nearly annually), it would be hig hly diffi cult to establish any causality between tax legislation changes and changes in total ACs. 12 Thus, the need to collect cost data by type of tax should be strongly emphasised. 12 The year 1999 is perhaps an exception, as ACs rose markedly after one of the most radical tax changes (which occurred in 1998) -the introduction of the VAT.
FIGURE 6 Salary expenses in Croatia and the EU, percentage of ACs, 1997-2011*
FIGURE 7
ACs and GDP developments in Croatia, 1997 Croatia, -2012 Source: Ministry of Finance (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Figure 7 suggests that the increase in ACs in Croatia during the period 2002-2012 could be related to economic growth (GDP movements); the TA, CA and FP simply have higher expenditures during periods of economic growth, whereas they spend less during economic downturns. More analysis is needed to explain this relationship, but the previous tables and fi gures suggest that one of the reasons is that during the periods of economic growth, in addition to staff expenses, the costs for IT services increased dramatically (costs related to maintenance and support for existing software).
CONCLUSIONS
The goals of this article were to determine whether the effi ciency of the Croatian tax authorities improved over the period 1997-2012 and to identify how their effi ciency can be improved in the future. The key indicator of the analysis (ACs as a percentage of GDP) declined during the observed period but remained above the EU member state average. Therefore, the TA and CA should intensify their efforts to reduce ACs. The tax authorities should seek to collect the maximum revenue at the minimum cost within the existing taxation framework (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989:203) . The fi rst action that the tax authorities could take is to identify and, if possible, abolish nuisance taxes that raise very little revenue and have high administrative costs. Second, there is a need for a thorough analysis of ACs to establish whether they can be reduced. According to the present analysis, staff expenses, IT expenses and expenses for telephone, mail and transportation services represent the largest expenditure categories. Consequently, both the TA and CA should devote particular attention to analysing these expenses to determine whether and to what extent they can be reduced.
In the period 2002-2012, ACs in Croatia were primarily related to economic growth (GDP movements), as the expenditures of the TA, CA and FP are higher when the economy is strong and lower during economic downturns. During periods of economic growth, in addition to staff expenses, the costs for IT services increased dramatically (costs related to maintenance and support for existing software).
As in previous studies (e.g., Ott and Bajo, 2000; Bratić and Pitarević, 2004; Vitek and Pubal, 2002), this research was constrained by the unavailability of public data. Due to inadequate data, ACs cannot be attributed to individual types of taxes, which is a situation that should be improved in the future. Such information would help the TA and CA to establish which taxes are the most expensive to administer and fi nd appropriate measures, if necessary and/or possible, to reduce the underlying costs. To obtain a better picture of the total cost of collecting taxes and to be able to minimise them, in addition to researching administrative costs, it is also necessary to research the compliance costs of each tax because there is an element of transferability between administrative costs and compliance costs (as the government may assign the responsibilities for and costs of collecting taxes to tax- PIT -the PA increases to 1,250 kuna -the total health insurance contribution rate is reduced from 18% to 16%
CIT -investment incentives are introduced
2001
VAT -the list of products that are taxed at the reduced (zero) rate is expanded PIT -rates of 20% and 35% are replaced by rates of 15%, 25% and 35%
PIT -four new types of tax relief are introduced (the employment incentive, education and training incentive, deduction of insurance premiums paid by taxpayers to domestic insurance companies and incentive for selfemployed individuals in ASSCs and in the City of Vukovar who determine their income as the difference between receipts and outlays on the basis of business books) CIT -the general rate is reduced to 20%
CIT -a tax on dividends for non-resident legal entities is introduced;
-tax relief for ASSCs and investment incentives is changed;
-incentives for the City of Vukovar, employment incentives and disabled persons' incentives are introduced
2002
PIT -an incentive for HMAs is introduced SOC.C -a special contribution for insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases is introduced (0.47%) CIT -incentives for HMAs are introduced 
